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Abstract: This paper uses the concept of ecological civilization (EC) that has been developed within
China and is now promoted within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The paper
critically examines the suitability of China’s environmental law as an export product and uses the
law and economics literature to formulate some critical observations with respect to the suitability
of Chinese environmental law as an export product. Law and economics are also used to analyze
the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature, arguing that the reduction of environmental
pollution will only occur with an increase in regulatory and institutional structures. Then, the law and
development literature is employed to critically analyze the so-called legal transplants phenomenon,
whereby particular legal rules from a donor country are transplanted to a host country. That literature
argues that transplants may lead to rejection if they are not demand-driven and do not take into account
local needs. The paper therefore concludes with some implications for the idea of transplanting the
concept of EC along the BRI.
Keywords: Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC); Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); law and economics;
law and development; legal transplants
1. Introduction
The concept of ecological civilization (EC), developed over a period of years within China, has now
been put forward by the Chinese leadership within the framework of the so-called Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI). The EC concept is a rather vague notion translated as a conservation culture or ecological
progress referring to the need to develop an energy- and resource-efficient, environmentally friendly
structure of industries in China [1]. The BRI is primarily a project to develop a large infrastructure
along spatial corridors linking China with various regions of Eurasia, motivated by geostrategic and
economic development priorities [2]. This combination of the notion of EC within the BRI has several
interesting aspects. One is that it provides an alternative discourse for sustainable development within
China itself [3]; the other is a rather external perspective, as the EC concept also implies the export of
Chinese environmental standards to the extent that the standards in host countries would be lower
than those in China. Some international stakeholders are even urging China to assist BRI host countries
to improve pollution technologies, to help them meet their respective commitments under the Paris
Agreement and the sustainable development goals (SDGs) [4]. China has even explicitly, in a response
to criticism on the potentially polluting effects of the BRI, responded in 2017 with the BRI Ecological
and Environmental Cooperation Plan, which refers to ecological civilization [5]. It is particularly
with respect to the latter aspect of EC that I would like to present several reflections, not so much
to either criticize or analyze the current strategies within the BRI, but rather to put this in a broader
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framework of the relationship between economic development and environmental protection, and the
role of environmental standards in that respect. It will simply be argued that that literature may have
considerations that could be valuable for some of the “export” aspects of EC.
It is as yet not totally clear what is exactly meant with this concept of ecological civilization [6],
neither is it totally clear how the concept of ecological civilization relates to the BRI. One aspect of the
BRI is that it may lead to impressive infrastructure projects in countries along the road, which could
potentially have ecological impacts [2,7]. The concept of ecological civilization could potentially
guide Chinese investors in their decision-making along the road. However, the concept of ecological
civilization could also play a role where environmental standards in host countries are lower than those
of China. It has been argued that ideally the concept of ecological civilization could lead to increasing
environmental standards in host countries, as the joint responsibility of the Chinese entities and their
host country counterparts [8]. It is especially on this latter aspect that this contribution wants to focus,
realizing that the BRI undoubtedly has many other aspects that are worth examining, such as the
question whether (international) norms and principles, for example, the application of environmental
impact assessments (EIAs), will also apply to projects along the BRI. The aspect I want to focus on in
this contribution is the potential transnational application of (Chinese) environmental standards to
projects along the BRI. Several streams of literature are of interest in this respect.
One relevant body of literature deals with the relationship between economic development and
preferences for environmental protection. It is often argued that developing countries have, at least in
the initial stages of economic development, a lower demand for environmental protection. That may
lead to a situation where, at least in the beginning of economic development, environmental quality
decreases. That leads to the first question of whether, in that respect, the preferences of the host states
should be respected or whether the transition to a green economy should be pushed through even if
that would not necessarily correspond with the preferences in the host state. The issue is closely related
to the so called Environmental Kuznets Curve literature, indicating that the relationship between
economic development and environmental quality shows an inverted U-curve: after initial pollution
levels increase with growing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) levels, at some point increasing GDP
leads to a lowering of pollution levels. However, studies by Esty and Porter have indicated that
it is not economic growth as such that causes pollution levels to go down, but rather the fact that
increasing GDP levels go hand in hand with improving governance structures in a particular country,
including the quality of environmental law.
That has led to a movement to transplant best practices concerning environmental standards
to developing countries, and in that sense the current idea to export EC fits within such a strategy,
long undertaken on the one hand by former colonialists towards their ex-colonies, but also by
international institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
which have often imposed particular models of environmental standards upon developing countries
as conditions for financing. It is the well-known concept of “legal transplants”. Empirical evidence
concerning the success of those transplants is mixed. Especially the “law and development” literature
has been very critical, in which it is argued that these transplants are often based on a “theory of lack”
and were found to be offensive and humiliating, leading to a rejection by the host state. The law and
development literature points to the sources for the failure of many legal transplants, but equally
indicates under which type of conditions legal transplants can be successful, for example, if they are
demand-driven and fit into the institutional and cultural legal context within the host country.
Similar lessons equally come from recent law and economics literature [9–12], in which it has
been argued that the type of environmental governance instruments that may be optimal for the
developed world (and from a theoretical perspective) may not necessarily work in developing countries
where the same conditions (concerning the absence of collusion and sufficient human capital within
administrations) may not necessarily be present.
To an important extent, the current documents concerning the BRI seem to take into account
some of the lessons of that literature concerning, for example, inclusive and transparent stakeholder
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consultations [8]. Yet, in this paper, I will proceed to a more general review of that literature, as to some
extent the export of the concept of EC may apply to countries with a lower development level than
China, and this raises many of the abovementioned questions. Both the law and development and law
and economics literature include considerations that could inspire the debate, indicating under which
particular conditions such an initiative might indeed lead to improving environmental quality in the
countries along the BRI, which seems to be the narrative of the Chinese leadership.
The paper will be structured as follows: after this introduction (Section 1), the fundamental
question will be asked of to what extent China’s environmental law can be considered as a desirable
export product (Section 2); next, the mentioned economic literature concerning the relationship between
environmental standards and preferences will be sketched (Section 3), as well as the literature related to
the Environmental Kuznets Curve (Section 4). Section 5 deals with the desirability of legal transplants
from a law and development perspective and Section 6 presents recent insights concerning legal
transplants from a law and economics perspective. Section 7 analyzes the consequences of this literature
for the desirability of exporting the concept of “ecological civilization”. Section 8 concludes.
2. China’s Environmental Law as an Export Product
Even though there are still many uncertainties, both concerning the precise meaning of the concept
of ecological civilization [1], as well as concerning the impact of “ecological civilization” on the BRI,
I focus on the question of whether ecological civilization in the BRI could imply that Chinese standards
could (or should) be imposed on projects along the BRI if the host countries might hypothetically
have lower environmental standards than China. I have to stress that even though some literature
speculates that this may be a consequence of applying ecological civilization to the BRI, there are
still many uncertainties concerning the precise interpretation, as a result of which it is not sure how
the concept will precisely be applied in practice. The question I will address as a starting point
concerns the extent to which current substantive environmental law (law in the books) in China can
be considered as a desirable export product [1]. Of course the concept of ecological civilization is
potentially much broader than environmental law, even though Barresi rightly stresses the role of
law in building the ecological civilization. China now has an impressive body of environmental law.
The Chinese legislator has made “a great leap forward” as far as the development of environmental
law is concerned [13], and especially the 2015 reform of the Environmental Protection Law in China in
principle allows for an adequate protection and increased environmental quality. However, authors also
agree that even though the scope of the legislative framework concerning environmental policy in
China has gone through important changes, the practical application, in other words, the “law in
action”, still remains an important problem. Barresi points at the compliance and enforcement problems
with which environmental law has been plagued in China [1]. Many obstacles to the implementation
of environmental law in China have not been fully addressed and resolved. Old problems, such as the
lack of capacity within China’s bureaucracies and legal institutions, have still not been adequately
addressed [14].
There are equally many empirical studies that show that the environmental challenges in China
remain large, notwithstanding the legislative framework [15]. Note, however, that many of the
empirical studies that report on the problematic state of the environment in China date from before
the most recent legislative changes. It is beyond the scope of this short article to discuss these studies
in detail, but the environmental problems with which China is faced have been well documented.
China is still confronted with life-threatening air pollution. Air quality in most Chinese cities still
exceeds the standards recommended by the World Health Organization [16,17]. The main contributor
to smog in China is PM2.5. Recent studies have found that China is among the regions with the
highest concentration of PM2.5 [18] and the level of PM2.5 concentration has significantly increased in
most Chinese provinces between 2001–2003 and 2008–2010 [19]. Ma et al. estimated the daily PM2.5
concentrations in China with fused satellite aerosol optical depth (AOD) as the primary predictor
and found that over ninety-six percent of the Chinese population lives in areas that exceed the
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Chinese National Ambient Air Quality Standard Level 2 standard (annual mean concentration of
PM2.5 being 35 µg/m3) [20]. A report issued by Greenpeace concludes that “The microscopic PM2.5
particles penetrate deep into the lungs, and further into the bloodstream, causing inflammation,
respiratory problems, coagulation of blood and toxic effects on many internal organs, including the
brain. The result is increased risk of death from heart attack, stroke, lung cancer and respiratory
diseases, and increased risk of asthma and respiratory infections” [21]. The growing trend of NOx
emissions is also worrisome. It is a consequence of the construction of new power plants, the rapid
increase of vehicles and a lack of NO2 emission control measures. NOx emissions have increased from
11 million tons in 1995 to 26.1 million tons in 2010 [22].
Similar pessimistic stories equally appear from studies with respect to water pollution, where the
situation is potentially even worse. In the words of Richard Smith, “If the air is bad, the water is
far worse” [23]. The 2013 State of the Environment Report issued by the Ministry of Environmental
Protection (MEP) shows that the surface water quality in the main rivers in China has further
deteriorated [24]. Similar reports on bad water quality equally relate to the groundwater: 90% of
China’s shallow groundwater is polluted. A report issued by the Ministry of Land and Resources in
2014 shows that among the 4778 spots in 203 cities monitored by the Ministry of Land and Resources,
underground water quality is ranked “relatively poor” in 43.9% and “very poor” in another 15.7%.
According to China’s underground water standards, water of relatively poor quality can be used for
drinking only after proper treatment. Water of very poor quality cannot be used as a source of drinking
water. The report further shows that, on a year-by-year basis, the water quality has worsened in 754
monitored spots and has improved in only 647 areas [25–27].
In the literature, several causes of this environmental disaster are indicated. One important
cause is bureaucratic politics, more particularly conflicts between the environmental ministry,
non-environmental ministries and local governments who are more concerned with economic growth,
industrial development and increasing fiscal revenue than with environmental quality. Attempts to
strengthen environmental legislation in China often have been met with strong opposition from
politically powerful actors within the government [28,29]. As a second reason, the weakness of the
court system and the limited access to justice are mentioned. Courts in China are renowned for their lack
of independence from political interference [30,31]. Courts are also reluctant to accept cases brought by
ordinary citizens against the government. In practice, cases may be refused by the Court for a number
of reasons, in some cases simply because the case is politically sensitive [32]. It is therefore unsurprising
that the literature concludes that the courts only play a marginal role in China’s environmental
governance [33]. Public and private enforcement are therefore generally considered weak and access
to justice is problematic. Victims in China still are confronted with many barriers to access justice [34].
The public enforcement system is improving, but generally still considered weak [35]. One of the
reasons for the weak enforcement relates to the under-financing of local regulatory agencies [36].
Local MEP branches depend on local governments for their funding, which also approve promotions
and allocate resources and personnel, making them financially vulnerable [37–39]. As far as the
implementation of the concept of eco-civilization is concerned, it also has been shown that although this
concept drives conceptual thinking on sustainable urban development in China, in practice a systematic
implementation gap appears to exist at the level of local implementation [3]. Capital accumulation in
the mechanisms for urban development and power accumulation in the mechanisms underlying the
administrative process are indicated as the main causes of this mismatch [3].
In sum, law enforcement in China seems to be improving, but is still very problematic for
several reasons: first, there is a strong focus on an investment-based growth of China’s economy.
The strong focus on economic growth and the investment-driven growth pattern has had catastrophic
consequences for the environment [40]. A second related issue is that the “growth first” ideology is
combined with a lack of political rewards for environmental protection for subnational government
officials. Evidence shows that local officials are rewarded (for example by being promoted to a higher
rank) for achieving hard targets, such as GDP growth and tax revenue, but not for fulfilling soft
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targets, such as improving environmental quality [41]. Finally, powers for environmental policy have
been decentralized, but this decentralization is not generally accompanied by the appropriate budget.
A report issued by the OECD [42] concludes that “Capital spending and public administration takes a
large and, until recently, increasing share of China’s overall public spending”. Other reports show that
China’s public spending on social protection and health as a share of GDP is significantly below average
levels for OECD and upper-middle-income countries [43]. The local governments have to rely largely
on transfers from the central government to finance their operations. However, those transfers are not
sufficient to finance local governments’ public services, such as environmental protection. Barresi also
indicated that China’s environmental laws depend for their enforcement upon local environmental
protection bureaus, who are for their funding mostly dependent upon local governments [1].
As already indicated, ecological civilization is undoubtedly more than environmental law and
some of the problems indicated in the literature are partially based on studies reviewing environmental
quality in China several years ago. Meanwhile important steps have been taken to improve legislation.
However, some of the fundamental causes explaining the failure of environmental law in China have
not been removed as a result of which it still remains to be seen whether the recent legislative changes
will allow a real improvement in environmental quality.
As for the question of whether China’s environmental law could be considered an appropriate
export product, this brief review of some literature shows that, when focusing on environmental
law in host countries along the BRI, it is not sufficient merely to focus on the quality of
substantive environmental law, but that attention should equally be paid to practical implementation
and enforcement.
3. Environmental Standards and Preferences
The law and economics literature argues that the demand for environmental protection within
a particular country or region will be dependent upon the preferences of the population, and those
preferences can be linked to the level of development within the particular country or region. In that
sense there is a relationship between economic growth and income levels within a country and
the demand for environmental protection [44]. In developing countries where poverty still reigns,
the satisfaction of primary needs (food security, healthcare, basic income) can be considered as a
primary need, which may explain a focus on economic development [45]. The preferences for a
particular environmental quality within a country or region may well therefore depend upon the
level of economic development in that country. As a consequence, environmental quality standards,
i.e., the standards that determine the desirable environmental quality to be reached in a country [46],
should also be differentiated, taking into account individual preferences of the citizens in the particular
country or region [46].
Cooter and Schäfer developed a similar logic concerning safety levels in developing countries.
They refer to the subjective values that individuals place on their own risk, including the risk of death.
Individuals in developing countries value life lower than in the developed world [47]. As a result,
poor people spent less on their own safety than rich people. Thus, the laws in poor countries will,
so Cooter and Schäfer hold, cause people to spend less on the safety of others than the laws in rich
countries. Environmental standards will therefore be substantially lower in poor countries as compared
to rich countries [48].
The problem with this literature is obviously that it assumes that regulation adequately reflects the
preferences of citizens. Public choice literature has rightly pointed out that regulation is often the result
of the demand by rent-seeking interest groups and the supply by wealth-maximizing politicians [49].
The result is, also in the environmental domain, that environmental law often does not correspond
at all with the preferences of the citizens [50]. Institutions in bureaucratic systems will often prevent
(environmental) regulation from corresponding with the preferences of the citizens [51].
Notwithstanding these limits concerning the strong assumptions of the law and economics
literature (that environmental standards would correspond with preferences), one interesting
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implication is that it is not possible to define something like one “optimal” environmental standard that
would apply across all countries or regions. Given the relationship between economic development and
the corresponding preferences for environmental protection, differing preferences and demands should
be taken into account. This may have important consequences for the desired level of environmental
quality in particular countries or regions. Some of the host countries along the BRI may be in a lower
level of economic development than China and may have preferences for different (presumably lower)
environmental quality standards than China. Given this relationship between economic development
and the preferences for environmental protection, these differing local preferences and demands should
be respected. As a consequence, the mere fact that in a host country lower environmental quality would
be established, should not be an argument to impose the (presumably higher) environmental quality
standards from China as long as the quality standards applicable in the host country correspond to the
preferences of the citizens. Given the public choice effects that may affect the quality of environmental
regulation, it is certainly doubtful that local regulations would correspond with the preferences of the
citizens, but that does not imply that Chinese standards would in that respect necessarily be better.
This basic insight concerning the relationship between economic development and environmental
protection has also led to literature known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature.
4. Environmental Kuznets-Curve
The concept of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) (see Figure 1) is named after the earlier
work of Nobel prize winner Simon Kuznets. Kuznets originally examined the relationship in specific
countries between income inequality and income levels [52]. At the end of the past century, this idea was
also applied in order to examine the relationship between economic development and environmental
quality. The so-called EKC points to a relationship between the gross domestic product (GDP) in
a particular country and environmental pollution [44,53]. The EKC literature points at an inverted
u-curve. This implies that when a particular country starts economic growth and income levels are low,
the increase in income levels first leads to an increase in environmental pollution. There is, however,
a particular point (which is represented by the top of the inverted u-curve) where an increase in
GDP no longer leads to more pollution, but to higher environmental quality. In that second phase,
an increase in income levels therefore leads to improved environmental quality. This is shown in the
following curve:
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The empirical studies on this EKC curve have also gained importance at the policy level through
the World Bank as the World Bank mentioned the EKC literature in its World Development Report
1992. A policy conclusion that was derived from this literature was that especially developing
countries would have an interest in focusing on developing economic growth, assuming that this
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would eventually also lead to lower pollution levels. One of the authors of the 1992 World Development
Report of the World Bank, Beckerman [45], stated in that respect: “it is fairly clear that the best way to
improve the environment of the vast mass of the world’s population is to enable them to maintain
economic growth” and “the strong correlation between incomes and the extent to which environmental
protection measures are adopted demonstrates that, in the long run, the surest way to improve your
environment is to become rich” [45].
There may be several reasons that could explain the EKC, in other words, why at some point a higher
GDP in a particular country would lead to an increase in environmental quality [54]. First, when in a
particular country’s GDP increases, the economy may rely less on (polluting) manufacturing by industry,
turning to a (less polluting) economy based on services; second, the increase in income levels can equally
lead to technological innovation and a better use of primary materials and energy. This finding relates
to the research by Michael Porter, who argued that investments in environmental protection by a firm
would not necessarily lead to a reduction in profitability. Porter held that both companies and countries
can benefit from investments in environmental protection [55]. This “Porter hypothesis” argues that
efforts to increase environmental performance at the firm level necessitate innovation, which leads
to both increased environmental performance and higher profitability. The Porter hypothesis also
received some empirical support [56]. Third, the increase in GDP in a country may equally lead to
different preferences of the citizens: once a certain level of economic development has been achieved
(and poverty has been eliminated) the citizens may also demand higher environmental quality.
Arrow et al. formulate this as follows “People spend proportionally more on environmental quality as
their income increases” [57]. Finally, there is always a risk that when nations have reached a particular
level of development, they would shift their polluting industries (and corresponding emissions) to
developing countries. Sun et al. argue that this may also occur along the BRI, thus supporting the
pollution haven hypothesis [58].
There is empirical evidence to support the EKC, but the evidence does not provide an unequivocal
result [59]. The EKC has been studied inter alia for Latin America by Cansino et al. [60] and
Jimenez et al. [61], but also for China [62], as the question obviously arises of whether China
has already reached the tipping point where higher income levels reduce pollution levels. There is
some empirical evidence to support that hypothesis, but it strongly depends upon the type of pollutants
involved [62,63]. According to Chen et al., the EKC pattern may not be valid for situations involving
the most damaging pollution [64].
It is not so clear what the lessons are from the EKC literature for environmental policy. Concerning
the World Bank approach, mentioned earlier, this showed there is a danger that one would (wrongly)
derive from this literature that a country can achieve higher environmental quality simply by promoting
economic development. Such a vision was, however, qualified by Ayres as “false and pernicious
nonsense” [65]. It is not economic growth that causes pollution levels to go down. Higher income
levels do not automatically lead to lower pollution levels [57].
One important issue is that the EKC literature is certainly not one-dimensional. It does not
apply for all pollutants. Moreover, there are important differences in environmental pollution levels
between nations with comparable income levels. Those differences can hardly be explained by the
EKC. The methodology and economic techniques of current EKC research have been questioned due to
controversial empirical research [64]. Dan Esty and Michael Porter examined the relationship between
GDP levels in a large number of countries and several indicators for environmental quality [66,67].
In addition, they also included parameters to examine the intensity of the institutional and regulatory
regime in a country. They found that there is indeed a relationship between increasing income levels
and better environmental performance, but that there is equally a relationship with the strength of
the institutional and regulatory regime in the particular country [66,67]. In other words, they argue
that it is not economic growth as such that correlates with improved environmental quality in a
country, but rather the quality and intensity of environmental regulations as well as the enforcement.
The conclusion from this important research is therefore that there may be a correlation between rising
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income levels and improved environmental quality (as the EKC indicates), but that this relationship
is particularly determined by institutional features, such as the respect for the rule of law and the
quality of the governance structures in the particular country [67]. The research equally indicated that
when countries introduced a more intensified institutional structure to control environmental pollution
(in other words more stringent environmental law), this would only increase the income levels rather
than reduce them [67].
The consequences of this important research are that it is especially the quality of institutional
and governance structures (in other words environmental law) that determines the development of
environmental quality. The EKC indicates a relationship between increasing income levels and lower
pollution levels, but the research by Esty and Porter indicates that these pollution levels go down not as
a result of increasing income levels as such, but as a result of an improved institutional and governance
structure in the particular country [66,68]. This is also confirmed in a recent study by Rahman et al. [69],
who argued that in Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar environmental quality indicators improved
over time thanks to strict regulations and technological improvements. This literature therefore fully
supports the current developments in China whereby much more attention is given to the improvement
of the quality of environmental legislation. Chinese leadership now relates the concept of ecological
civilization to the Environmental Kuznets Curve, referring to a quote by Xi Jinping, stating that
“Green waters and clear mountains” will provide “gold and silver hales” [6]. The EKC literature equally
provides support for paying attention to the quality of environmental regulation (via the concept of
ecological civilization or otherwise) in projects along the BRI. The clear lesson is that merely stimulating
economic growth in those host countries will not automatically lead to improved environmental quality,
but that the quality of environmental regulation matters as well. That then raises the question of what
is adequate environmental regulation for developing countries.
5. Legal Transplants, Law and Development
Specific attention to the relation between the quality of the law and development in a particular
country has been paid by the so-called law and development literature. This literature has serious
doubts concerning the possibility for law to really reach economic development [12]. Much attention
in that literature is paid to the fact that, especially in developing countries, informal alternatives to
low pay often a more important role than formal legal rules. For example, with respect to China,
specific research indicated that securing property rights and enforcing contracts were traditionally
not the main purpose of law in Asian societies [70–72]. Law was rather an instrument to promote the
interests of the state. Because the effects of law were often unpredictable, traders preferred to avoid
formal contacts with the legal system. Instead, an informal mechanism governing the relationship
between merchants developed next to the formal legal system. As this informal system lacked formal
enforcement, it strongly relied upon trust between the merchants to make sure that economic exchanges
could take place. Economic activities were therefore strongly based on social relations. It is referred to
as “relational capitalism” and was relatively successful as a mechanism governing the relationship
between business parties in Chinese communities in Southeast Asia in the past, and still is today [70].
This does not imply that informal law would under all circumstances be preferable to formal law.
Informal law has a number of disadvantages as well. One limitation is obviously that if economic
exchange is embedded within social relations, economic transactions will also be limited to the persons
with whom social relations have been developed. Another problem is the succession, more particularly
when assets have been concentrated within family companies. Informal law may equally be too static
and difficult to change. Moreover, as informal law lacks a system of formal enforcement, there is a
danger that alternative means of enforcement would be employed. This was for example the case
in Russia [70,73]. It shows that systems of formal and informal law can also coexist [74]. There are,
moreover, inter-dependencies between informal and formal law in governing social relations [75].
Informal law is de facto especially important in developing countries where traditionally a reliable
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formal legal system was lacking. Taking account of such legal pluralism is particularly important in
considering legal reform in (developing) host countries along the BRI.
One method to develop an institutional structure in developing countries is by importing legal
rules from the North (de facto often from former colonies) and transplanting them to developing
countries [76]. This is referred to as a system of legal transplants. The advantage is that it may
allow developing countries to rely on best practices concerning particular legal rules. However,
legal transplants are not always based on the demand from the developing countries concerned.
Often countries in the North base a transplant on the fact that the developing country would lack
particular legal rules that do exist in the North. It is referred to as the “theory of lack” [77]. An example
of this is contained in the traditional idea that China lacked what was considered as a decent legal
system, other than the criminal law [78]. The theory of lack starts from the idea of a cultural superiority
of the legal system in the North and is therefore often considered as humiliating and offensive.
That can also explain some of the resistance in developing countries against those legal transplants.
Many transplanted rules therefore lacked effectiveness. An important condition for a legal rule to work,
for example in the area of environmental norms, is to understand how local communities interact with
their environment [12]. A legal transplant may work if the legal culture of the receiving developing
country and of the legal system of the transplanted rule share some common basic norms [12]. The most
important condition for a legal transplant to be effective is that it should be based on the demand
from the developing country concerned, rather than being imposed from the North to the South [79].
Moreover, it may be necessary to adapt the transplanted rule to the specific conditions in the receiving
developing country. That may allow the transplanted legal rule to function in an effective manner in
the new legal culture [12].
Modern China has a long tradition of incorporating legal rules from other legal systems into
Chinese law, yet at the same time adapting the transplanted rule to the specific needs of China.
In that respect China seems to incorporate the lessons from the just-mentioned literature concerning
the conditions for an effective use of legal transplants. For example, the Chinese Anti-Monopoly
Law [80–83] has been strongly based on the European example [84]. China has been successful in
applying transplanted rules as it has a utilitarian approach towards legal rules. In this respect Chen
holds: “[S]ocialist ideology is upheld rhetorically, [but there is no] discussion [in transplants about]
‘Chinese characteristics’ [and] Chinese scholars [mainly] advocate[e the] direct copying of foreign
law” [85]. In this respect, Chen quotes Seidman who states that legal “drafters can learn literally
nothing from the black-letter texts of foreign law; they can only learn from studying the law and
its social consequences in its country-specific setting” [86]. The strengths and weaknesses of the
judiciary in China have also been studied by Zhang and Zhang [87] and Peerenboom [88]. As far as
environmental law is concerned, China has also looked at Western environmental laws as sources for
inspiration, with a mixed record of success [1]. Still, also in China questions are asked on whether,
particularly in the environmental area, China has not blindly transplanted too easily legal rules from
the West (US and Europe), whereby the question could be asked whether the transplanted legal rules
were always fit for the Chinese legal tradition [1].
Again, this literature has potentially interesting policy consequences, both for environmental
law within China itself and for the desirability of transplanting Chinese environmental law to host
countries along the BRI. Those implications will be discussed in further detail below in Section 7.
6. Recent Insights from Law and Economics
The law and economics literature has to some extent the same starting point as law and development
by stressing that much of the environmental law in developing countries was based on the application
of legal rules from the former colonialists in the developing country concerned. The law and economics
literature also stresses that for this reason those rules were not always adapted to the particular situation
in the developing country, which led, not surprisingly, to poor environmental law and serious pollution
problems in many countries [12]. To some extent this is blamed on a failure to implement environmental
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law and on enforcement problems [89]. However, even though enforcement problems are certainly
not denied, it is not considered the only reason for a lack of effectiveness of environmental regulation
in developing countries. The structure of the environmental norms itself plays an equally important
role [12]. There are several recent streams of literature within law and economics that have important
lessons for the effectiveness of environmental regulation in developing countries. One important
starting point is to take the institutional limits in developing countries into account when choosing
a particular structure of environmental law [90]. In that respect the law and economics literature
has addressed the situation when ex ante specified rules set by the legislator would be preferred
in comparison to vaguer ex post standards developed either by the judiciary or by administrative
agencies. This is known as the rules versus standards literature [91–94]. A standards-based system of
environmental law uses vaguer standards developed ex post by the judiciary or by administrative
agencies, whereas a rules-based mechanism relies on environmental norms to be developed by either
the legislator or higher levels of the executive power.
Recent scholars have argued that a fundamental problem in developing countries is the lack
of human capital. If the human resources required to apply vague standards was indeed lacking,
a rule-based system might have particular advantages [11,75]. Generally, vague standards appear to
have initially lower costs (as the desired behavior does not have to be specified in a large amount
of detail). But at a later stage the vague standards need to be implemented and enforced and then
they lead to higher costs. In countries with scarce human resources, a rule-based environmental law
system has the advantage that the behavior required from the operators will be determined ex ante
in a specific manner at the state level, no longer requiring further implementation at lower levels.
The system would in other words rely on specific and detailed ex ante rules set by the legislator,
which reduces the need to rely on a further implementation of vague standards by either the judiciary
or lower administrative agencies [10]. In a context where there may not be an independent judiciary,
capable of implementing vague standards, a rule-based mechanism also may have advantages. It is
less vulnerable to the negative influence of corruption and lobbying efforts [75]. For that reason, it is
also held that the common law system, which strongly relies on vague principles to be applied by the
judiciary, may not be effective in developing countries [95].
A consequence of this literature for the development of environmental law is that when a country
lacks human resources, particularly within administrative agencies, it would be wrong to create an
environmental law that would need administrative agencies for its implementation. The case of
Indonesia can illustrate this. The country issued several environmental management acts, which,
for its effective implementation, needed executive orders. Those were, however, never issued as a
result of which the legislation remained ineffective [96]. This illustrates the more general point that
when a particular country lacks the human resources needed to implement central legislation, it may
be more effective to structure environmental law in such a way that it is not dependent upon further
implementation by administrative agencies.
A second type of literature in law and economics related to corruption proceeds in the same way.
Corruption may seriously jeopardize the implementation of environmental law in developing countries.
The first best solution is obviously to counter corruption and to enforce environmental regulation in an
effective manner [97–99]. However, for decades, many people have already devoted a lot of time and
effort to fight corruption within administrative agencies in developing countries. The results of those
efforts have, however, been disappointing and corruption often continues to flourish [100]. If a country
keeps relying on the fight against corruption, it may be difficult to reach an effective environmental
law. For example, in Indonesia, it was shown that 18% of the rice that was meant for redistribution
disappeared [101].
Another approach to corruption would be to recognize that in some developing countries
corruption at various levels of governance is a serious issue and consequently to choose a design of
environmental law that is less vulnerable to corruption. Ogus has argued that, as it is apparently
difficult to ban corruption completely, it is better to design regulation that is less vulnerable to
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corruption by particular civil servants [9,10]. Ogus equally builds upon the rules versus standards
literature mentioned earlier, arguing that vague standards provide room for interpretation (and thus
corruption) by particular civil servants within administrative agencies. He argues that the major
advantage of precise rules is that it reduces the room for discretion by civil servants [10]. Posner also
held that precise rules have the advantage that they allow a better control of judges and could equally
reduce the danger of corruption [11,75]. “General rules may indeed be suitable to overcome . . . the
capture problems—that is, the susceptibility of government agencies to lobbying enterprises—that
result from decentralized standard setting” [96].
There is a third theme of the literature within law and economics, equally relevant to this topic,
dealing with the question of whether environmental regulation should preferably be centralized or
decentralized. Decentralized decision-making generally has the advantage of decision-making by the
local authorities who have better information on the environmental problem at hand. Yet, a major
disadvantage is that local authorities often have too close a relationship with local industry. A result
may be that local authorities could be vulnerable to lobbying and corruption by the local industry. If that
is the case, decision-making at the central level may have the advantage that those decision-makers
are further away from the local interests, as a result of which decision-making in the public interest
may be more likely. The public choice literature has indicated that large lobby groups will have
relatively high transaction costs to organize whereas smaller lobby groups, which are single-issue
oriented, will face lower transaction costs [102–105]. Research with respect to the effectiveness of
environmental law, particularly in developing countries, has also shown that it may be very difficult
for local authorities to issue environmental regulation in the public interest, even if they are not corrupt,
simply because of the economic importance of the industry for the local community. So-called public
choice distortions (in other words lobbying) may especially occur at lower levels of governance;
which is also why they occur within federal systems that have in some cases been advanced as a
reason for centralization [106,107]. Several studies have also indicated that, in practice, local elites
in developing countries are often able to capture the local authorities, putting more vulnerable
groups like fishermen and small farmers in a disadvantaged position. Those studies indicate that it
would be to the advantage of those vulnerable groups to have decision-making at the central level
whereby the central law can be enforced against the local lobby groups. It is for that reason that some
studies have been critical of decentralization efforts concerning fisheries in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was
argued that the decentralization did not improve the governance structure and changed the power
distribution to the disadvantage of poor fishermen [108]. Another study showed that a change to
decentralized decision-making concerning natural resource management in Mali de facto created a
new local elite, undermining the existing customary institutions to the disadvantage of vulnerable
groups [109]. As far as China is concerned, the literature indicates that important problems with
the enforcement of environmental law occurred, especially after decentralization of administrative
powers to the provinces [110]. As far as India is concerned, the effectiveness of so-called “participatory
committees” in the domain of forest management was examined. The study led to the conclusion that
the effectiveness did not depend upon devolution, but upon state accountability [111]. Several studies
equally indicate that when there is a capturing of the local decision-makers by the elite, it is often to the
detriment of the environment. A study concerning the well-known scheme of payment for ecosystem
services in Costa Rica was considered successful. Yet, the beneficiaries of the payments were mostly
the relatively wealthy farmers rather than the vulnerable groups [112].
These new insights concerning the effectiveness of environmental regulation in developing
countries may have important policy consequences that will be addressed now.
7. Implications for Ecological Civilization along the BRI
Let me now try to summarize some of the lessons that could be learned perhaps for the
concept ecological civilization generally, but especially for the central question to this contribution,
which concerns the extent to which ecological civilization could also guide the actions of China in host
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countries along the BRI. There are several potential lessons that could be drawn from this literature.
Obviously the literature will not be repeated; instead I will focus on the main policy consequences.
7.1. Focus on Law in Action, Enforcement
A clear lesson from the brief overview of the state of the environment in China itself (see Section 2)
is that it does not suffice to have a decent environmental law in place, but that it is equally important
to focus on implementation and enforcement. The overview made clear that most scholars agree
that China now has an up-to-standard environmental legal framework, but notwithstanding that it
still suffers from major environmental issues, which are to a large extent due to structural problems
regarding enforcement and implementation. That is an important conclusion regarding the possibilities
for improving environmental quality in China itself, but equally for potential actions regarding
environmental quality in host countries along the BRI. The lesson is that it would clearly not suffice
(to the extent that it would be considered desirable) to focus merely on improving the quality of the
environmental legislation in the host countries, but that it is equally important to focus on an adequate
framework allowing the implementation of the formal rules.
7.2. Respecting Local Preferences and Demand
The related Sections 3 and 4 focused on the economic literature concerning the relationship
between economic development and environmental quality. Given that many countries along the BRI
may be developing countries, the question arises of the extent to which the presumably higher Chinese
environmental quality standards should be imposed upon host countries. The general lesson from the
economic literature is that, since environmental quality is crucially linked to economic development,
it is important to respect the preferences for environmental quality in the host country. The extent to
which the level of development in the host countries along the BRI is lower than in China, could lead
to a demand for a lower level of environmental quality.
At the same time, the literature with respect to the EKC makes it clear that further economic
development can eventually increase environmental quality, but only on the condition that this is
accompanied with respect for the rule of law, adequate regulation and an appropriate institutional
framework. The lesson from the EKC literature is therefore clear: if environmental quality is to
be promoted in host countries along the BRI, focusing on promoting economic growth, it makes
sense for it to be accompanied at the same time by a strengthening of the institutional environmental
legal framework.
7.3. Law and Development
It has more particularly been the so-called law and development literature that has largely focused
on the question of what then constitutes adequate environmental law, i.e., adapted to the specific needs
of developing countries. An important part of the literature addresses the desirability of so-called
“legal transplants”, i.e., transplantation of a legal rule from a donor to a host country. Starting from
the empirical fact that many legal transplants were not a major success and often in fact led to a
rejection of the transplanted rule, the literature stresses that probably the process of adapting the
rule is more important than merely the focus on contents. A successful legal transplant should be
user-driven and based on local demand and ownership. Crucial elements are the receptivity of the
transplant within the existing legal culture in the host country as well as the familiarity of the host
country with the transplanted rule. A related warning addresses the fact that in developing host
countries, the institutional framework may often be different than in the donor country from which the
transplanted rule originates. An issue of particular importance is the prevalence of informal law in
developing countries and the resulting hybrid legal system whereby informal and formal laws are
mixed. The literature therefore does not generally reject legal transplants, but simply sketches particular
conditions that should be taken into account as determinants of successful transplants. This literature
is certainly of relevance also for China itself where environmental law has, to a large extent, also been
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based on legal transplants. Barresi questions the extent to which particular transplanted rules fit with
China’s own legal tradition [1]. However, the legal transplants literature is equally important for
China’s actions in host countries along the BRI: transplanting legal rules from China to host countries
may work, but the specific conditions (such as the local demand, the transplant being user-driven and
the way it fits into the legal culture of the host country) are important elements to be taken into account.
7.4. Lessons from Law and Economics
The recent law and economics scholarly literature presented in Section 6 may imply that the policy
recommendations concerning optimal environmental law could be different for developing countries
than for developed countries.
First, the lack of human capital (and capacity) in developing countries along the BRI may necessitate
minimal reliance upon highly refined and elaborate environmental legal rules, which depend to a
large extent for their effectiveness upon implementation by administrative authorities. If a developing
country does not have the human resources within administrative agencies or within the judiciary who
are able to implement environmental law, it will not be very effective. A consequence in this particular
situation is that the use of vague standards, such as standards in environmental permits, is not likely
to be effective. The better alternative would be for the central legislator to define the obligations with
which operators have to comply in a specific manner. As a result the legislator directly determines the
specific rules and there is less need to rely upon a further implementation by either administrative
authorities or the judiciary. That structure equally has the advantage that it provides less discretionary
power to administrative agencies, thereby also lowering the risk of corruption [12].
A second consequence of the literature is that one would have to reconsider the advice that
traditional environmental law and economics scholarly literature has often formulated, which is to use
so-called incentive-based environmental instruments. Examples of those may be environmental taxes
and emission trading. Although they undoubtedly have strong benefits as well, a major disadvantage
is that instruments like taxation and emission trading are based on an exchange of funds between the
regulatees and administrative agencies. In an environment where corruption is widespread, that may
not be a smart idea. Moreover, environmental taxes and emission trading equally require a detailed
system of implementation, for which the human capital may again be lacking. Developing countries
can therefore rely more on specific and clear rules in central legislation, which provide less discretion
to civil servants within administrative agencies [113].
A third lesson from the law and economics literature relates to (de)centralization. Traditionally many
have advocated environmental decision-making at the local level where decision-makers may have the
best information on the environmental problem to be regulated. In principle, local decision-makers may
have optimal information on the specific environmental problem to be regulated. There is, however,
particularly in developing countries, a serious risk that the local politicians might be lobbied or bribed
by the local elite. Given the importance for the local economy and employment of many industrial
activities (such as for example mining), it may be very difficult for local decision-makers to determine
environmental obligations in the public interest. When that danger exists, it may be preferable to shift
decision-making to the central level, where there can be a greater likelihood of standard setting in the
public interest.
A consequence of the survey of this literature is that the ideal, smart mix of environmental policy
instruments designed for developed countries cannot automatically be transplanted to developing
countries. That optimal mix is often based on particular assumptions about the availability of human
capital and civil servants acting in the public interest, assumptions that are often not met in developing
countries. If that is the case, the optimal mix of environmental instruments for developing countries
may look different. That can be an important consideration for policy advice from China with respect
to the implementation of ecological civilization in host countries along the BRI.
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8. Concluding Remarks
In this contribution, I have focused on two recent and important policy developments in China,
on the one hand the concept of ecological civilization, and on the other hand the belt and road initiative;
the focus of this contribution was particularly on the combination of the two. “Ecological civilization”
presents a different narrative than the stories heard so far about either sustainable development or
the green economy. Goron [6] argues that since its introduction in 2000, ecological civilization is now
increasingly used both in academic papers and in newspapers and is moreover used much more often
in academic articles in China than the concept of sustainable development. Replacing “development”
by “civilization” has emphasized a shift from the economic to the political, the cultural and the moral
dimensions. Goron [6], however, argues that the transformative reach of ecological civilization as a
theory of sustainability is politically restricted as it supports the CPC’s claim to power based on its
promise to bring about progress for Chinese society, as well as the world. It is a different concept
and it clearly indicates the ambition to be broader than traditional notions of environmental law as
the reference to “civilization” refers also to incorporating cultural aspects. Ecological civilization is
associated with the notion of “harmony between man and nature” [6]. That may be a typical Asian
approach to environmental issues as, for example, also in Bali the concept of “tri hita karana” (the unity
of mankind in its relationship with the divine, nature and others) is employed to suggest a balance
between spirituality, social welfare and nature [114].
By relating the concept of ecological civilization to the BRI, China has an opportunity to show its
environmental leadership in the world by showing concern for environmental quality, more particularly
in developing host countries along the BRI. This was recently also advocated by Rahman et al.,
arguing that the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar economic corridor under the BRI should not only
focus on connectivity and massive infrastructure development for securing economic growth among
themselves, but also undertake a long-range policy to cope with environmental degradation and to
ensure sustainable green infrastructure [69]. As such, that approach also fits into the quest for a global
environmental law searching for principles underlying all legal systems, such as has been undertaken
inter alia by Yang and Percival [115,116].
In this contribution, I drew a parallel between China’s current environmental ambitions along
the BRI and attempts from developed countries in the North to improve environmental quality in
developing countries in the South. That literature (from both law and economics, law and development,
but also other disciplines) points to a few rather obvious lessons that have to be taken into account
when promoting environmental quality through legal rules and more particularly legal transplants
from donor countries. One of those is to respect cultural diversity and more particularly the different
legal culture in the host country and the fact that transplants should not be imposed in a top–down
manner, but should be driven by local demand to increase receptivity. Ascencão et al. advocate that to
promptly raise awareness about the possible environmental and social risks of the BRI, there needs
to be dialogue among those involved in the decision-making process, including NGOs and local
communities [7].
Even though there are currently still many uncertainties surrounding both the concept of EC and
BRI, the literature clearly indicates that by promoting the improvement of environmental legislation
in the host countries along the BRI, there should be transparent stakeholder consultations and the
literature equally refers to inclusive legal transplants and respect for cultural diversity. Boer refers to
the need to support BRI countries to develop procedures for environmental impact assessments and
inclusive and transparent stakeholder consultations [8]. This shows that there is already awareness
among the Chinese leadership of the importance of local demand and ownership of the institutional
reforms in the host countries along the BRI. I argued that it may be useful to learn from past experiences
(both positive in the form of best practices and negative in the form of regulatory failures), as these
lessons (incorporated in the literature discussed in this contribution) could be helpful on the challenging
road to implementing ecological civilization equally in host countries along the BRI.
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